Promises, Promises...

A Look at NATO Expansion and What to Make of it

First, a quick note: When I started this blog during the Covid pandemic, I was focused primarily on critiquing the media and their terribly uncritical promotion of the threat of the SARS-Cov-2 virus to exaggerated heights. The name, “The Devil Makes Three,” is a nod to the age old notion that “the devil is in the details,” and now that the pandemic is in the rear view mirror, I want to move on to nitpicking the details in other hot button issues. So if you follow me because of my writing about covid, that topic is likely not going to be addressed much further, but hopefully you stick around as I move on to engage with other issues.

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The war in Ukraine is now a year and a half in the running, and popular support for sending money, arms, and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces seems to be on the slide here in the US. Opponents to sending aid to Ukraine are a Venn diagram of Tucker Carlson conservatives, RFK Jr. liberals, conspiracy goofs, and contrarian Twitter (a sect of people who act as if they are smarter than everyone else in the room and who also feel the need to be aggressive assholes about it).

One of the main arguments trotted out by those who are against US or other western support for Ukraine that I find so frustrating to see again and again, is the argument that the US and NATO somehow provoked this war. That Russia was left with no other option than to invade. This is preposterous in its face and can be quickly disproven by asking the simple question, “What would have happened to Russia had they not invaded?” Well…they wouldn’t have lost hundreds of thousands of troops, they wouldn't have to keep hiking their interest rates to keep their currency afloat, and they’d still be selling oil and gas to Europe. They would not have lost their statehood or anything of the sort because that was never actually on the table, so basically it would be 2021 all over again. 

Now of course, I would like to point out that I feel I am an “anti-war” person myself, and by that I mean that if it were up to me, governments would use militaries only defensively. I am not, however, so anti-war as to suggest that countries which have been invaded should, in the name of some higher, more Ghandian-buddhist-Code Pink principle, just roll over and take whatever their aggressors are dishing out. And in this particular conflict, it is Ukraine that was invaded and so my anti-war sentiment is squarely aimed at Russia.

“But NATO!” you scream in my face (or type furiously at me) “They provoked Russia by expanding to their borders even though they promised never to move one inch to the east back in 1990!”

And there it is, the central lie - or misunderstanding at best - that undergirds most of the arguments in favor of letting Russia roll its armor into its neighboring country while raining missiles on their cities and intentionally attacking their energy and food producing infrastructure (something the online antiwar types seem to not lose much sleep over). This claim that there was a promise that NATO would not expand does not and never did exist, and I’d like to demonstrate that here. 

First, where does this come from? This idea of such a promise? Well if we look to the website, National Security Watch and their article “NATO Expansion, What Gorbachev Heard,” by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, we’ll read that:

“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.”

Wow! Heavy stuff. A cascade of assurances including that the US Secretary of State assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand one inch eastward! Well, let’s pack it in folks, this is pretty clear cut.

Or is it?

First, we have to ignore for the moment that the US Secretary of State doesn’t have the power to make promises for all of NATO. Second, we have to ignore that none of this was ever codified in a written treaty or agreement. But what matters most here, is the fact that the promise Baker made was not about NATO expansion at all. That is to say, it was not about the addition of new countries into the security alliance. How do I know that? Well, because people in the room say so. Former US Under Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was in that meeting and he says explicitly, “there was no promise not to enlarge NATO.”

“Oh come on!” you smack out on your keyboard. “You can’t trust this guy! Of course he would say that. He is part of the US war machine!” OK, fine, let’s find another, less biased source. Who in that room could speak to the Soviet side and what Gorbachev heard? Who indeed? How about…Mikhail Gorbachev himself? What does he say was discussed in that room? 

In 2014 Gorbachev sat down for an interview with the Russian magazine, Russia Beyond and he was asked specifically about this issue:

“RB: One of the key issues that has arisen in connection with the events in Ukraine is NATO expansion into the East. Do you get the feeling that your Western partners lied to you when they were developing their future plans in Eastern Europe? Why didn’t you insist that the promises made to you – particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East – be legally encoded? I will quote Baker: “NATO will not move one inch further east.”

Great question Russia Beyond! Way to get right to the heart of the matter! Let’s hear Gorbachev eviscerate those putrid, lying Americans with his side of the story.

“Gorbachev: The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement, mentioned in your question, was made in that context.”

Whaaa?!?! It turns out, Gorbachev himself claims the issue of NATO expanding eastward wasn’t discussed at all. AT! ALL! And why would it have been? Where was NATO going to expand into at that time? You have to think of the context of the conversation. It was 1990. The Soviet Union still existed. The Warsaw Pact still stood. The countries to the east were allied with the Soviet Union. Maybe Yugoslavia was an option, but countries like Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania would have been out of the question to even consider as potential members of NATO, unless of course, everyone in that meeting, including Gorbachev, decided to plan for the total collapse of the USSR that day.

Further, Gorbachev explains what was discussed, which was moving non-German NATO forces from west Germany into East Germany after the country was unified. That is what was promised not to move one inch to the east. 

“Gorbachev: The agreement on a final settlement with Germany said that no new military structures would be created in the eastern part of the country; no additional troops would be deployed; no weapons of mass destruction would be placed there. It has been observed all these years.”

So according to Gorbachev, insofar as Baker’s specific words, and his specific promise, the US and NATO made good on it. Gorbachev goes on:

“Gorbachev: The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.”

Gorbachev here is saying that the actual promise made regarding the military units in Germany were “enshrined” in law, meaning, formally written into the final agreement, which was signed and then carried out. Again, the US and NATO, according to Gorbachev, made good.

Now, like Gorbachev does here, have there been people who suggested that there was a spirit to this understanding? That by promising not to move the NATO forces in West Germany to the east implied that years later, when the Soviet Union collapsed, that should have meant that no new countries east of that line should have been added to the alliance? Sure. One can argue all day and into the next about what the general spirit of an agreement is, but the spirit of the thing is not the thing itself. The spirit of a thing is what individuals in their heads think and feel something should imply, beyond what it actually says. I’m sorry to say that, when it comes to international agreements, the spirit of a thing will always fail because each side is going to interpret that differently, with their own interests guiding that interpretation. That’s why the words in signed treaties matter, because there is no argument after the fact about what has been specifically agreed to by the parties involved.

Returning to National Security Archive and their article, “NATO Expansion, What Gorbachev Heard,” (which it should be noted was published three years after the article in Russia Beyond in which Gorbachev explicitly states what, in fact, he heard, but somehow goes uncited), we see a host of other clipped quotes from western officials regarding questions surrounding only what can be described as the spirit of that discussion. For instance, Savranskaya and Blanton write:

“The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.”

What’s being discussed here is that the West German Foreign Minister made a speech - prior to the meeting with Baker, Gorbachev, and others - in which he stated his opinion that perhaps after reunification, the East German territory should not be utilized by NATO. Honestly, this whole section is a big, “What the hell does this have to do with anything?” It was one man stating his opinion in a time when the Soviet Union was still in existence, that they Germans needed to be careful not to upset the Soviets if they wanted a unified country again. It is not an actionable promise or agreement and wasn’t spoken in any official capacity to the Russians.

Savranskaya and Blanton then go on to point out that surrounding the reunification agreements, there was all sorts of talk to soften Gorbachev and make him feel confident that NATO was not a threat to the Soviet Union. They go on at length describing the various points at which NATO members suggested to one and other that they should assure Gorbachev that NATO would not expand, but again, these are internal discussions amongst representatives from NATO countries figuring out their best pitch to the Soviets, not promises made. Not ink signed. For instance:

“The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.”

This is not a promise to the Soviets. It’s a possible bargaining chip that was discussed between the Germans and British days before the meeting with Gorbachev.

They then go on to write: 

“Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)” 

Well, I opened Document Six (titled: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker) and did a search for the phrase “NATO expansion is unacceptable” and did not find that in the document at all. (It seems the authors of the article don’t realize what quotation marks are for). Reading the document you find in the conversation between Baker and Gorbachev pretty much what Gorbachev explains in his 2014 interview; that he and Baker are talking about placement of NATO military forces as related to German reunification.

The long and short of it is, Gorbachev wasn’t a dummy, and everything the Soviets negotiated for regarding German reunification was written into the final agreement on the matter . Nothing about whether or not countries east of Germany could apply for membership and then be admitted into NATO is included in that document. 

But there is, in fact, a document that was signed by both the US and Russia (Not the USSR, but the current Russian Federation) that is conveniently ignored again and again by the likes of online contrarians, and that is the Budapest Memorandum. Signed in 1994, the focus of this memorandum was to remove the nuclear weapons that the Soviets had placed in what then became the independent nation of Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this document, the US, Russia, and the UK agreed to guarantee the security of the nation of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine giving up the nuclear weapons within their territory. The memorandum includes sections that state:

“The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”

And

“The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

So while there is a constant noise and pushing up of invisible glasses as people tweet their snark about a promise Jim Baker had no power to make and never in fact made, there is an actual signed agreement between the relevant nations in which the signatories did in fact promise not to use force against Ukraine’s territory and also to act in defense of Ukraine should they become the victims of aggression.

While certainly there are other issues at play that are worth discussing when it comes to US and western support for Ukraine and what that should look like, the next person to bring up that all of this boils down to a promise about NATO expansion needs to be locked in a closet where their ahistorical inanity can no longer poison the discussion. While they’re in that closet, they should be given a headlamp and a copy of both Russia Beyond’s interview with Gorbachev and the Budapest Memorandum so they can spend the time puzzling out the difference between what they think they know about the big-bad-double-crossing-NATO and was actually agreed to between the US and Russia since 1990. And throw in a copy of the Russia Founding Act of 1997 for good measure.

This article has been updated for clarity, spelling, and word choice.